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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-2030
________________
PETER JOE RIVERA,
                  Appellant
   v.
RALPH E. MARCOANTONIO, JR.; I. WILLIAMS #367;
RONALD GONZALEZ #367
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-03689)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
 _______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 29, 2005
Before:     ROTH, McKEE and ALDISERT, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed:  November 3, 2005 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Peter Joe Rivera appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. 
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for
2further proceedings.
In October 2001, Rivera was civilly committed to the Special Treatment Unit
(“STU”) in Kearny, New Jersey pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator
Act.  When Rivera entered the STU, he was told that it was a smoke free facility.  In
August 2003, he filed a complaint claiming that Darryl Williams, Senior Corrections
Officer, and Ralph Marcoantonio, Assistant Superintendent, violated his civil rights by
permitting other inmates and employees to expose him to “environmental tobacco smoke”
(“ETS”).  Rivera also alleges that he faced retaliation for his complaints about the ETS. 
As part of his treatment at the STU, Rivera participated in group therapy, which
was directed by Ronald Gonzalez, a psychologist at the facility.  Rivera alleges that
Gonzalez violated his right to freedom of speech, his right against self incrimination, and
his due process rights by insisting, during group treatment sessions, that Rivera provide
details regarding prior sexual acts and by inaccurately characterizing Rivera’s
improvement and rehabilitation when reporting to the courts.  Rivera also claims that
Gonzalez violated his due process rights by opening and rejecting mail that contained
what Gonzalez considered sexually explicit material.
Williams and Gonzalez each filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court
granted.  The court also dismissed the complaint as to Marcoantonio for failure to serve. 
Rivera filed a timely appeal.
We exercise plenary review over an order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).  We will
affirm a dismissal for failure to state a claim if we can “‘say with assurance that under the
     Because Rivera was civilly committed under the New Jersey Sexually Violent1
Predator Act, he made his claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982).   However, Eighth
Amendment standards are applicable to his claim.  See Inmates of Allegheny County Jail
v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979).
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allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”  McDowell v. Del.
State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972)).  We accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.  Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 232-
33 (3d Cir. 2004).   Dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend is justified only on
the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.  Id. at 235-36. 
Rivera claims that exposure to ETS in the STU violated his constitutional rights. 
Applying the standard set forth in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993),  the1
District Court determined that Rivera had not been exposed to unreasonably high levels of
ETS.  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Rivera failed to state a claim. 
Rivera complained of improper ventilation and imperfect enforcement of a no-smoking
policy.  He admitted, however, that he can escape ETS exposure by going to his room. 
He did not describe an unreasonable exposure to ETS.  Compare, e.g., Helling, 509 U.S.
at 35 (holding that bunking with a cellmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes per day
exposed an inmate to an unreasonable risk of future harm from ETS exposure), and
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a prisoner who
4claimed that he had shared a cell with constant smokers for many months stated a claim
for a violation of a clearly established right) with Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495,
498 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that sitting near some smokers sometimes is not an
unreasonable exposure to ETS) and Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 267 (D.D.C.
1995) (dismissing an ETS claim in which the plaintiff alleged “only that various unnamed
inmates and prison officials smoke ‘in the TV room, games room, and the letter writing
room’”).   
To the extent that Rivera made a claim of present injury because of exposure to
ETS, the appropriate standard against which to test his claims is Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976).  See Atkinson, at 316 F.3d at 266.  He contended that exposure to
cigarette smoke has caused him to suffer respiratory distress and has aggravated his
diagnosed illness of tuberculosis.  Even if Rivera has a serious medical need to be distant
from ETS, see, e.g., Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 268, his admission that he can avoid the
smoke and the occasional violations of the no-smoking policy undermines his claim of
deliberate indifference.  His allegations, taken as a whole, do not describe conduct that
rises to the level of wanton infliction of pain.  Furthermore, in light of the totality of his
allegations, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.
Although Rivera did not state a claim based on ETS exposure, on the record before
us, it appears that he stated a claim of retaliation.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333
(3d Cir. 2001).  Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Rivera has a constitutionally
protected right to seek redress for a perceived violation of his due process rights.  See
Helling, 509 U.S. at 35-36.  The facts alleged relating to Williams’ actions, including
5verbal abuse, encouraging other residents to take action against the “snitch,” and refusal
to unlock Rivera’s door, if proven, would rise to the level of “adverse action.”  The
District Court thus erred in concluding that Rivera failed to state a retaliation claim.
The District Court failed to address Rivera’s claim that Gonzalez violated his
constitutional rights by opening and rejecting his mail.  We express no opinion as to the
contours or merits of this claim.  Rivera also claimed that Gonzalez violated his rights by
requiring him to discuss past sexual acts, including those related to an offense for which
he had not been convicted.  As we are remanding this matter and anticipate that there will
be further development of the record, we will not address the District Court’s analysis of
this claim.  We note only that, unlike the plaintiffs in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002)
and Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2003), whose participation in prison
programs was voluntary, Rivera apparently was required to participate in treatment, a
distinction that may have a bearing on the question of coercion.   
Finally, the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint as to Marcoantonio for
failure to serve.  An affidavit filed by Defendants’ counsel in the District Court (D.C.
Doc. # 8) indicates that Marcoantonio was served on August 30, 2003. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings. 
